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NO LOSS, NO PROBLEM: HOW THE SECOND CIRCUIT
ALTERED DURA AND THE CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC LOSS IN
SECURITIES FRAUD CASES IN ACTICON AG V. CHINA NORTH
EAST PETROLEUM HOLDINGS, LTD.
John Arganbright*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is a securities fraud plaintiff precluded as a matter of law from
sufficiently pleading economic loss and/or loss causation if she had the
opportunity to sell her stock for a gain subsequent to a defendant1
company’s corrective disclosure? Recently, in Acticon AG v. China
North East Petroleum Holdings, Ltd., the Second Circuit answered in the
negative, allowing plaintiffs who alleged securities fraud to progress
past the pleading stage despite having the opportunity to sell their
2
stock for a gain on several occasions. This decision abrogated three
3
federal district court decisions within the Second Circuit, and stood
in direct contrast to two federal district court decisions from outside
4
the Second Circuit.
Those five federal district courts relied principally on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, in
which the Court clarified the pleading standard for private securities
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2014; B.A. Political Science,
La Salle University, 2011. Many thanks to Chris Rojao, Brian Jacek, John Badagliacca,
Matt Engel, and Professor Ron Riccio for their editorial assistance.
1
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2010) (establishing the pleading requirements
for a private securities fraud action under SEC Rule 10b-5); Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (listing the six elements necessary for a private
securities fraud action pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).
2
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41–42 (2d
Cir. 2012).
3
See generally In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp.
2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD01695(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007); Malin v. XL
Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 1,
2005).
4
See generally In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09-CV-2351-TWT, 2011 WL
384421, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011); Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C.
2009).

279

ARGANBRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/2014 3:53 PM

280

[Vol. 44:279

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
5

actions. In Dura, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not
sufficiently plead loss causation simply by alleging and then
establishing that the stock price was inflated on the day of purchase
due to misrepresentation; instead, plaintiffs must prove that the
6
misrepresentation proximately caused their loss.
Seemingly
extending that principle, the five federal district courts held that
when the stock in question returns to or eclipses its pre-disclosure
price, the plaintiffs have not suffered any economic loss, and thus
cannot sufficiently assert that the defendants’ alleged fraud
7
proximately caused any loss. The Acticon decision, however, has
called into doubt both the district courts’ interpretation of Dura and
the future of private securities actions in which a stock price, despite
allegations of fraud, subsequently rises above its purchase price after
a corrective disclosure.
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit should have
followed the district courts’ interpretation of Dura, both from a legal
8
and logical standpoint. Part II analyzes the relevant securities laws
9
and the history of loss causation and economic loss. Part III looks at
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura, the five district court decisions
interpreting its revised pleading standard for private securities fraud
10
actions, and the Acticon decision. Part IV explains how the Second
Circuit misinterpreted Dura, why the district courts’ interpretation is
superior, what the Second Circuit should have done to extend Dura
and the principles of the relevant securities laws, and the
11
ramifications that will follow.
This Comment concludes by
suggesting that the Supreme Court clarify the pleading standard for
both economic loss and loss causation in private securities fraud
12
cases.

5

544 U.S. at 347–48.
Id. at 344–47.
7
See, e.g., Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43 (noting that if a stock “could have been
sold at a profit [after the close of the class period], the ‘actual economic loss’
contemplated in Dura is precluded”); Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4 (“[A] price
fluctuation without any realization of an economic loss is functionally equivalent to
the Supreme Court’s rejection of an artificially inflated purchase price alone as
economic loss.”).
8
See infra Part IV.A.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part IV.
12
See infra Part V.
6
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II. THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LOSS AND LOSS CAUSATION IN
SECURITIES FRAUD ACTIONS
Economic loss and loss causation in securities fraud actions have
a relatively short, complex history. Congress passed the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) to regulate secondary
13
markets after the Great Depression.
Shortly thereafter, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in furtherance of §
10(b) of the Exchange Act, promulgated Rule 10b-5, which generally
made it unlawful to issue false or misleading statements in relation to
14
the purchase or sale of securities. Since § 10(b) did not explicitly
create a private cause of action for plaintiffs, and since the SEC did
not define the contours of a 10b-5 action, interpretations of both the
statute and the Rule were left primarily to the courts, which have
implied a private cause of action for an alleged 10b-5 violation since
15
at least 1946.
Additionally, since Rule 10b-5 is largely a judge-interpreted,
judge-made device, the elements of such an action have developed
over time. Since at least 1974, however, courts have inferred loss
16
causation as an element of a 10b-5 claim, interpreting it as a concept
17
comparable to the doctrine of proximate cause in tort law. This
judicial inference persisted until 1995, when Congress passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which codified
18
loss causation as an explicit element of a Rule 10b-5 claim.
Beyond just codifying the elements of a 10b-5 claim, the PSLRA,
given the “uncertainties” of Rule 10b-5 and “conflicting legal
standards,” also sought to curb abuses of the securities laws, which
had manifested itself in the form of many meritless claims over the
13

15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2006).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006); see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 729 (1975).
15
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n. 10 (1983) (citing
Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), as the first court to
imply a right of action for an alleged 10b-5 violation).
16
See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
17
See Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-MarketBased Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharms., 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 33 (2008); see, e.g.,
Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir.
2003) (comparing loss causation to proximate cause); Castellano v. Young &
Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp.,
968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1994) (same).
18
Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995) (codi• ed at 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(4) (2010)).
14
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last few decades. As a result, the PSLRA heightened the pleading
standard for securities fraud cases by forcing plaintiffs to plead
20
What is unclear, however, is
certain elements with particularity.
whether either the PSLRA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require a heightened pleading standard for loss causation—an issue
21
that courts have addressed with varying conclusions.
Although the PSLRA does not explicitly list economic loss as an
element of a 10b-5 action, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
22
rule to require plaintiffs to plead economic loss. In fact, in Dura,
the Court listed the “basic elements” of a § 10(b) claim, and included
23
Although listed as
both economic loss and loss causation.
independent elements, economic loss and loss causation are often
inextricably linked in a 10b-5 case, because a plaintiff must have
suffered an economic loss before she can claim that the defendant’s
24
alleged fraud is the proximate cause of that loss. To illustrate, the
Supreme Court has said that loss causation “requires a plaintiff to
show that a misrepresentation that affected the integrity of the
market price also caused a subsequent economic loss,” linking the two
25
elements into one analysis.
Thus, for the purposes of this
Comment, a court that determines that a plaintiff has failed to
sufficiently plead economic loss is sufficiently analogous to another
court holding that the plaintiff has failed to plead loss causation since
26
she cannot show that she suffered an economic loss.
19

S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683–84; see
also Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 741 (noting that the potential for abuse of the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be more likely in cases
connected to the Exchange Act than other types of litigation).
20
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (requiring a plaintiff to plead the requisite
state of mind (‘scienter’) and ‘misrepresentation’ with particularity).
21
See infra Part IV.B.1.
22
See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(b)(4) and including economic loss as one of the six elements of a 10b-5
claim).
23
Id. at 341–42.
24
Id. at 336 (“An inflated purchase price will not by itself constitute or
proximately cause the relevant economic loss needed to allege and prove ‘loss
causation.’”) (emphasis added).
25
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011); see
also Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing
Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir.
2003)) (defining loss causation as “the causal link between the alleged misconduct
and the economic [loss] ultimately suffered by the plaintiff”), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
935, 935 (2005).
26
Compare Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 44 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that
the plaintiffs “fail[ed] to set forth facts demonstrating actual economic damages
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III. DURA AND THE FEDERAL COURTS’ SUBSEQUENT INTERPRETATIONS
OF ITS PRINCIPLES
A. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
In Dura, the plaintiffs brought a 10b-5 case against Dura
Pharmaceuticals (“Dura”), alleging that Dura made false statements
concerning the expected Food and Drug Administration approval of
a new asthmatic spray device, and that these false statements resulted
27
in an artificially inflated stock price.
The district court granted
Dura’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion, holding that the plaintiffs could not
sufficiently plead a causal connection between the alleged
28
misrepresentation and the plaintiffs’ economic loss.
The Ninth
Circuit reversed and remanded the case, positing that the plaintiffs
could sufficiently plead loss causation merely by alleging that the
security’s price was inflated at the time of purchase due to the
29
misrepresentation.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint,
concluding that the plaintiffs could not sufficiently plead loss
30
causation or economic loss. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice
Breyer identified three areas where the Ninth Circuit erred: its
31
interpretation of “fraud-on-the-market” cases,
its lack of
32
precedential support, and its oversight of important objectives of
33
securities laws.
First, the Ninth Circuit originally held that the plaintiffs need
only prove that the stock price was inflated on the date of purchase due
34
to the alleged misrepresentation, but the Court held that in a
normal “fraud-on-the-market” case, such as this one, an inflated
35
purchase price alone does not proximately cause economic loss.
within the context of loss causation as required by Dura“) (emphasis added), with In re
China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353–54
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that “the absence of economic loss is sufficient grounds for
dismissal [of the complaint]”) (emphasis added).
27
Dura, 544 U.S. at 336.
28
Id. at 340; In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. Civ. 99CV0151-L(NLS),
2001 WL 35925887, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2001).
29
Dura, 544 U.S. at 340; Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 939 (9th
Cir. 2003).
30
Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–46.
31
Id. at 342.
32
Id. at 343–44.
33
Id. at 345.
34
Broudo, 339 F.3d at 938.
35
Dura, 544 U.S. at 342.
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The Court concluded that “as a matter of pure logic,” a plaintiff does
not suffer any loss at the time of the purchase, since “the inflated
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant
36
possesses equivalent value.” Beyond that, the Court found that the
logical link between an inflated purchase price and any subsequent
economic loss was not conclusive, as the sale of stock at a lower price
after a corrective disclosure “might mean a later loss. But that is far
37
from inevitably so.” In fact, the Court specifically noted that a lower
price could reflect changing economic circumstances or investor
expectations rather than a causal connection to the alleged
38
misrepresentation.
Second, the Court pointed out that the Ninth Circuit’s central
holding lacked precedential support, as private securities fraud
actions usually resemble common law fraud actions, which require a
plaintiff to show not only that she would not have acted had she
39
known the truth, but that she actually suffered economic loss. Given
the requirement that a plaintiff show actual damages, the Court
found it unsurprising that other federal courts of appeals had both
40
previously and subsequently rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach.
The Court further noted that both the Restatement of Torts and
other treatises writers emphasized the need to prove, rather than
41
merely assert, loss causation.
Finally, the Court declared that the Ninth Circuit’s holding
contravened the purposes and principles of the federal securities
laws, which, in the Court’s opinion, make private actions available
“not to provide investors with broad insurance against market losses,
but to protect them against those economic losses that
42
misrepresentations actually cause.”
Again, the PSLRA requires
36

Id.
Id.
38
Id. at 342–43 (also mentioning that “new industry-specific or firm-specific
facts,” rather than the alleged fraud, could lead to the declining stock price).
39
Id. at 343–44.
40
Id. at 344; see, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp., Inc.,
343 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that allegations of an inflated purchase
price alone could not satisfy pleading loss causation); Semerenko v. Cendant Corp.,
223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d
1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (same).
41
Dura, 544 U.S. at 344–45; see W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E.
KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 110, p. 767
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §548A cmt. b, at 107 (1977).
42
Dura, 544 U.S. at 345; cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]llowing recovery in the
37
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plaintiffs to “specify” each misleading statement, plead certain
44
elements with particularity, and carry the burden of proving that the
defendant’s misrepresentations “caused the loss for which the
45
plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”
Given these statutory
requirements, the Court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s approach
would “allow recovery where a misrepresentation leads to an inflated
purchase price but nonetheless does not proximately cause any
economic loss. That is to say, it would permit recovery where . . . two
46
traditional elements. . . are missing.”
Due largely to these three concerns, the Court ultimately
reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint was
47
insufficient to state a claim for relief. Importantly, however, the
Court left two issues undecided: what types of specific facts a 10b-5
48
plaintiff must produce in order to sufficiently plead loss causation,
and whether a heightened pleading standard, pursuant to the PSLRA
49
or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to loss causation. As
a result of these two issues, the lower federal courts have interpreted
Dura in various ways, culminating in the Second Circuit’s recent
50
decision in Acticon.
B. Post-Dura Cases Involving Economic Loss and Loss Causation
Although the Dura Court left the two aforementioned issues
unresolved or unclear, various federal district courts—including the
51
district court decision that Acticon reversed —have interpreted Dura’s
principles and framework in the same fashion—one diametrically
opposed to the Second Circuit’s interpretation.

face of affirmative evidence of nonreliance
. . . would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of investor’s insurance. There
is no support in the Securities Exchange Act, the Rule, or our cases for such a
result.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2010).
44
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
45
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4).
46
Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
47
Id. at 342–46.
48
Id. at 346 (declining to address separate proximate cause or loss-causation
arguments).
49
Id. (assuming, for argument’s sake, that the securities statutes do not impose a
heightened pleading standard, but noting that the plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient
under either a Rule 8 or Rule 9 analysis).
50
See infra Part III.C.
51
See generally In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp.
2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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1.

Malin v. XL Capital Ltd.

Decided just a few months after Dura, Malin was the first case to
interpret and apply Dura to a situation where the allegedly inflated
stock price almost or fully recovered subsequent to a corrective
52
disclosure. In Malin, the plaintiffs alleged a Rule 10b-5 violation,
asserting that the defendants issued false and misleading statements
concerning the company’s financial circumstances, leading to an
53
inflated share price that fell after subsequent disclosures.
Furthermore, in an attempt to distinguish Dura, the plaintiffs
suggested that not only was there an inflated price, but that the price
54
drop was causally related to the subsequent disclosure.
In response, however, the defendants presented evidence that
the share prices fully recovered just a few months after the class
55
period ended.
With that in mind, the court posited that the
defendants’ evidence negated the plaintiffs’ inference that there was
a causal connection between the misleading statements and the price
56
drop. In its central holding, the Malin court ruled that “a price
fluctuation without any realization of an economic loss is functionally
equivalent to [Dura’s] rejection of an artificially inflated purchase
price alone as economic loss. If the current value is commensurate to the
purchase prices, there is no loss, regardless of whether the purchase price was
57
artificially inflated.” As a result, the court granted the defendants’
58
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the amended complaint.
2.

In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Securities Litigation

In In re Veeco, the lead plaintiff and defendants presented the
court with several motions in limine concerning alleged
59
misrepresentations in Veeco’s press releases.
In the defendants’
motion to preclude the lead plaintiff’s damages expert from offering
certain calculations as to potential damages, the defendants first
asked the court to prevent the expert from arguing that the damages

52

See generally Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL
2146089, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005).
53
Id.
54
Id. at *3.
55
Id. at *4.
56
Id.
57
Id. (emphasis added).
58
Malin, 2005 WL 2146089, at *4.
59
See generally In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695
(CM)(GAY), 2007 WL 7630569, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007).
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provision of the PSLRA was a means of measuring actual damages.
In the defendants’ estimation, the PSLRA provided a cap on
61
damages, rather than a measure of damages. The court agreed,
holding that § 21(D) of the PSLRA imposed a cap on the damages
available to plaintiffs, rather than measuring the amount of
62
damages.
Second, the defendants argued that the expert should not be
allowed to take into account any damages for shares sold after the
corrective disclosure at a price equal to or greater than the allegedly
63
inflated share price. Again, the court agreed with the defendants,
noting that the plaintiff’s damages expert also agreed when he stated
in his expert report that “[i]f either the inflation or price increased
over the holding period for any particular share, the share was not
64
damaged, so the damage for that share is zero.”
Finally, the defendants asked the court to preclude expert
testimony regarding any damages for the then-unsold shares that
65
were purchased prior to the corrective disclosure. The court first
noted that neither the PSLRA nor Dura imposed a “sell to sue”
requirement, but then reasoned that, under Dura, a plaintiff must
66
nevertheless still prove that she suffered an economic loss. In that
regard, the court directly relied on the Malin court’s interpretation of
Dura—that a plaintiff holding stock that was commensurate to its
purchase price suffered no damages, even if the purchase price was
67
artificially inflated. Thus, the court held that “[p]laintiffs who chose
to retain their shares past the point when the stock price first
recovered [to its purchase price] can prove no economic loss that is
68
attributable to any of the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations.”
Significantly, the court further noted that this analysis was in accord
with the lead plaintiff’s own damages expert’s conclusion that a
plaintiff suffers no damages if a share price increases over the
69
holding period.
As a result, the court ultimately granted the
defendants’ motion in limine to prevent the plaintiff’s damages expert
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Veeco, 2007 WL 7630569, at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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from portraying the damages provisions of the PSLRA as a means of
70
calculating damages rather than as a cap on damages.
3.

Ross v. Walton

In this 2009 case, the plaintiffs purchased Allied Capital stock
over a fifteen month period before Allied made a corrective
disclosure that caused the stock price to drop from $33 at the
beginning of January 10, 2007, to $31.58 at the end of that day, to
71
$27.79 at the opening on January 11. Additionally, in the ninety
72
days that followed, Allied’s stock never closed at a price above $32.
Consequently, the plaintiffs sought damages pursuant to the
73
Exchange Act and the PSLRA.
Apparently conceding that there was no “sell to sue” rule, the
defendants instead presented evidence that the stock was trading at a
profit one month before the plaintiffs filed their amended
74
complaint.
Therefore, the defendants relied on Malin’s
“commensurate value” holding, arguing that the plaintiffs should be
75
precluded from pleading loss causation. In this case, similar to the
plaintiffs in Malin, the plaintiffs argued that they need only allege
76
that a misrepresentation caused a facially plausible price drop. The
Ross court disagreed with the plaintiffs, noting that it was “unaware of
any authority in which actual economic loss was found when the stock
value returned to pre-disclosure prices and could have been sold at a
77
profit just after the class period.” In fact, the court acknowledged
that it was undisputed that the plaintiffs could have sold their stock
for a profit on at least three occasions in June 2007, a few months
78
after the plaintiffs had filed their complaint. Thus, while the court
agreed that there was no “sell to sue” rule, it concluded that Malin’s
interpretation of Dura was correct, in that Dura’s rationale precludes
a plaintiff from pleading “actual economic loss” if the stock could
79
have been sold for a profit after the corrective disclosure. The court
70

Id. at *7, *9.
Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 35–36, 41 (D.D.C. 2009).
72
Id. at 41.
73
Id. at 35.
74
Id. at 42.
75
Id.; see Malin v. XL Capital Ltd., No. 3:03 CV 2001 PCD, 2005 WL 2146089, at
*4 (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2005).
76
Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43.
77
Id. at 43.
78
Id.
79
Id.
71
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further asserted that, “[l]ogically, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the
amount the purchaser overpaid if the stock value rose greater than
80
the purchase price on multiple occasions.”
Finally, the court noted that since a § 10(b) claim involves fraud,
the plaintiffs must, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
81
82
9(b), plead the circumstances giving rise to fraud with particularity.
Nevertheless, since the plaintiffs could have sold their shares for a
profit on various occasions after filing their complaint, the court
found that “even under the Rule 8(a)(2) ‘facially plausible’ standard,
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate economic loss beyond a simple
fluctuation in value or, at best, an artificially inflated purchase price,
83
specifically rejected by Dura.” As a result, the court granted the
defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion, concluding that the fact that the
plaintiffs could have sold their stock for a gain precluded them from
84
pleading loss as a matter of law.
4.

In re Immucor, Inc. Securities Litigation

In this motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff claimed that the
court erroneously dismissed its claim that Immucor violated § 10(b)
of the Exchange Act by making false and misleading statements with
85
regard to its compliance with FDA regulations. In its initial order,
the court held that the plaintiff was precluded from pleading
economic loss and loss causation since Immucor’s share price
“quickly rebounded” to pre-disclosure levels after each corrective
86
disclosure. The plaintiff argued that the court’s conclusion was a
“clear error of law,” but the court, relying on both Ross and Malin—
where the stock prices reached or eclipsed the plaintiffs’ purchase
87
prices—denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
Specifically, even though the plaintiff tried to distinguish this case
from Ross and Malin, the court held that:
[G]iven the many factors that can affect share price,
contrasting the price immediately before the corrective
disclosure . . . and the price shortly thereafter provides the
80

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
82
Ross, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 38.
83
Id. at 43.
84
Id.
85
In re Immucor, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 1:09 CV 2351 TWT, 2011 WL 3844221, at
*1 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011).
86
Id. at *2.
87
Id. at *2–3.
81
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most relevant comparison for evaluating whether the stock
price dropped significantly following the corrective
disclosure and whether the disclosure caused the drop in
88
price.
As a result, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FDA-related
securities fraud claims due to the plaintiff’s inability to plead actual
89
economic loss or loss causation.
5.

In re China North East Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Securities
Litigation

In In re China North East, the lead plaintiff, Acticon, purchased
approximately sixty thousand shares of China North East Petroleum
Holdings Ltd. (“NEP”) over the course of five months—January 2010
90
to May 2010.
Ultimately, Acticon spent $434,950 for those sixty
91
thousand shares, resulting in an average price of $7.25 per share.
Following those purchases, NEP made multiple corrective disclosures
to its financial statements from prior years, leading Acticon to file suit
92
against NEP for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. NEP issued its
93
final corrective disclosure on September 1, 2010, but NEP stock
closed above approximately $7.25 on twelve separate days between
94
October and November 2010. Seizing on that fact, the district court
determined that, because the plaintiffs could have sold their shares
for a profit on multiple occasions following the corrective disclosures,
Dura’s principles—and Malin’s persuasive interpretation of those
95
principles—precluded the plaintiffs from pleading economic loss.
Alternatively, the plaintiffs argued that they should be able to
sue based on the losses suffered from the sales of stock they made
96
between December 2010 and May 2011.
In response, the court
recognized that the plaintiffs had suffered a loss, but ultimately held
88

Id. at *2. The court’s language seems to imply that Immucor’s stock never
fully recovered to its pre-disclosure price, but the court had previously said that the
stock did “quickly rebound[] to pre-disclosure levels after each of the FDA-related
disclosures.” Id.
89
Id. at *3.
90
In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
91
Id.
92
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir.
2012).
93
In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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that the plaintiffs could not impute their loss to any of NEP’s alleged
97
To that end, the court posited that “[a]
misrepresentations.
plaintiff who forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective
disclosure cannot logically ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused
98
by the disclosure.” Thus, the court granted the defendant’s three
motions to dismiss the consolidated complaint, becoming the fifth
district court out of five to interpret Dura as precluding pleading loss
causation/economic loss when the stock price had approached or
99
eclipsed the purchase price subsequent to a corrective disclosure.
C. Primary Case: Acticon AG v. China North East Petroleum
Holdings Ltd.
After the In re China plaintiffs appealed the district court’s
decision, the Second Circuit, in a matter of first impression, reversed
the district court, holding that the plaintiffs were not precluded as a
matter of law from pleading economic loss just because the stock
price had risen higher than the investors’ average purchase price
100
subsequent to the corrective disclosures.
Specifically, the Second
Circuit noted that the district court’s limitation on damages was
inconsistent with both the “out of pocket” measure of damages
traditionally used in § 10(b) actions and with the “bounce back”
101
damages cap in the PSLRA.
First, the Second Circuit observed that the “out of pocket”
measure of damages has traditionally been used to determine
102
economic loss in § 10(b) cases. Under that measure, “a defrauded
buyer of securities is entitled to recover only the excess of what he
103
paid over the value of what he got.” Moreover, the Second Circuit
reasoned that the Supreme Court has adopted the “out of pocket”
measure of damages, defining it as “the difference between the fair
value of” the plaintiff’s purchase and the fair value of what the
104
plaintiff would have received absent the fraud.
As a result, the
Second Circuit determined that the district court erred by failing to
apply the “out of pocket” method of damages, asserting that, aside
97

Id.
Id.
99
In re China, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
100
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 34, 36 (2d
Cir. 2012).
101
Id. at 39.
102
Id. at 38.
103
Id. (quoting Levine v. Seilon, 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971)).
104
Id. (quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)).
98
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from the “bounce back” provision in the PSLRA, Congress had not
105
otherwise altered the traditional method for calculating damages.
The Second Circuit further held that the district court’s
conclusion was inconsistent with the PSLRA’s “bounce back”
provision, which caps the amount of damages a plaintiff can receive
106
in a securities fraud action.
Under that provision, a plaintiff’s
damages cannot exceed the difference between the plaintiff’s
purchase price of the security and the security’s average trading price
107
in the ninety days following the final corrective disclosure.
Thus,
the Second Circuit concluded that Acticon would have only been
precluded from pleading loss causation under the PSLRA if NEP’s
average trading price over the ninety days following the last corrective
108
disclosure would have exceeded the plaintiffs’ purchase price.
In addition to these two apparent inconsistencies, the Second
Circuit determined that the Malin line of reasoning—on which the
109
trial court below relied—incorrectly interpreted Dura.
According
to the Second Circuit, those interpretations erroneously used as their
starting point the Court’s observation that “at the moment the
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant
110
possesses equivalent value.”
After reiterating that Dura did not
affect the traditional “out of pocket” measure of damages, the Second
Circuit posited that “a share of stock that has regained its value after a
period of decline is not functionally equivalent to an inflated share
that has never lost value . . . [because] it assumes that if there are any
111
intervening losses, they can be offset by intervening gains.”
To that end, NEP argued that the security price recovery
indicated that the market was unaffected by the corrective
disclosures, and that the disclosures were thus unconnected to the
112
plaintiffs’ claimed losses.
At this stage of the litigation, however,
the Second Circuit drew all reasonable inferences in favor of Acticon,
and instead determined that the plaintiffs here, unlike the plaintiffs
105

Id. at 39.
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38–39; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2010).
107
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1).
108
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39 (citing In re Mago Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454,
461 (9th Cir. 2000)).
109
Id. at 40–41.
110
Id. (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005)
(emphasis omitted)).
111
Id. at 41.
112
Id. at 39–40.
106
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in Dura, had alleged more than an artificially inflated price—they had
alleged that NEP’s stock dropped as a result of the corrective
113
disclosures. Thus, since the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs
were not precluded from pleading economic loss as a matter of law, it
114
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for NEP.
IV. HOW THE ACTICON DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
LANGUAGE AND PRINCIPLES OF DURA
After five federal district courts had uniformly interpreted Dura
as precluding a plaintiff from pleading economic loss and/or loss
causation when a security price recovers following a corrective
disclosure, the Second Circuit’s Acticon decision turned that
interpretation on its head, concluding the exact opposite and
creating confusion for both courts and commentators.
This
Comment argues that the district courts’ interpretation was superior
as a matter of legal interpretation and in relation to the goals and
principles of securities laws. Finally, this Comment also considers the
consequences of the Second Circuit’s decision moving forward.
A. The Second Circuit Misinterpreted and Misapplied Supreme Court
Jurisprudence in Acticon
In its rejection of the district courts’ interpretation of Dura, the
Second Circuit took umbrage with their damages analyses, essentially
concluding that they had used the wrong starting point, and/or had
115
misapplied the applicable measure of damages.
Specifically, the
Second Circuit’s assertion that the “out of pocket” measure of
damages is traditionally used for § 10(b) cases is problematic for two
reasons. First, even if one accepted this proposition, loss causation
116
would still be an issue.
Second, one could reasonably argue that
113

Id. at 40–41.
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 41–42.
115
Id. at 38–41 (analyzing the “traditional out of pocket” measure of damages for
§10(b) cases, and concluding that the Malin court’s interpretation of Dura was
inconsistent with that measure).
116
In fairness, the district court below based its holding on the premise that the
plaintiffs could not plead economic loss as a matter of law, so the Second Circuit
limited its holding to the same element. Theoretically, however, the district court, on
remand, could determine that even though the plaintiffs were not precluded from
pleading economic loss as a matter of law, that they had not sufficiently shown that
the defendants’ corrective disclosures were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’
“loss.” See supra Part II (linking the elements of economic loss and loss causation and
determining that a plaintiff must essentially prove that she has suffered a loss before
showing that the defendant’s actions proximately caused that loss).
114
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Acticon is distinguishable because it presents the unusual
circumstances where the stock price appears to have been
unaffected—or the market unconcerned—despite allegations of
fraud.
Despite these considerations, even the Second Circuit’s reliance
on the “out of pocket” measure of damages is questionable. For
example, the Acticon court asserted that the Supreme Court had
“adopted the out-of-pocket measure of damages” in Affiliated Ute
117
Citizens v. United States, but Affiliated Ute is readily distinguishable
from Acticon, as the former primarily concerned the misstatement of
a material fact in fraudulently-induced sales of stock in relation to
118
Rule 10b-5 and the Ute Indian Supervision Termination Act.
Additionally, the Supreme Court language on which the Second
Circuit relied in Acticon concerned damages under the damages
119
120
provision of § 28 of the Exchange Act, not § 10(b).
Finally, in
their brief to the Supreme Court, the Dura plaintiffs specifically
quoted Affiliated Ute and its conclusion that the measure of damages
should be “the difference between the fair value of all that the . . .
seller received and the fair value of what he would have received had
121
there been no fraudulent conduct.” Although the Supreme Court
did not explicitly address this contention in Dura, the Court did hold
for the defendants, which should be interpreted as the Court
implicitly considering and rejecting this argument and its assessment
122
of the supposedly relevant measure of damages. In that vein, since
the Supreme Court was not persuaded by this argument in Dura, it is
unlikely that it would find the same argument—and the Second
Circuit’s reliance on it—persuasive in the present, but admittedly
different, securities fraud case.
Furthermore, the Second Circuit posited that the district
courts’—specifically, the Malin court’s—reasoning was inconsistent
with the “out of pocket” measure of damages and the PSLRA’s
123
“bounce back” provision.
In the Second Circuit’s estimation, the
Malin court erroneously took as its starting point Dura’s observation
117

Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 155 (1972)).
118
Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 128–33.
119
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (2006)
120
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 38 (citing Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 155).
121
Respondents’ Brief, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No.
03-932), 2004 WL 2671450, at *18 (quoting Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154–55).
122
Dura, 544 U.S. at 344, 347–48.
123
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 39.
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that “at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff has
suffered no loss[, as] the inflated purchase payment is offset by
124
ownership of a share that at that instant possess equivalent value.”
In support of its own interpretation of the PSLRA and the relevant
measure of damages, the Second Circuit noted that:
a share of stock that has regained its value after a period of
decline is not functionally equivalent to an inflated share
that has never lost value . . . [because] [i]n the absence of
fraud, the plaintiff would have purchased the security at an
uninflated price and would have also benefitted from the
125
unrelated gain in stock price.
This interpretation, while ostensibly logical, seems to have been
foreclosed by Dura when the Supreme Court held that:
[w]hen the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even
at a lower price, that lower price may reflect, not the earlier
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances,
changed investor expectations, new industry-specific or
firm-specific facts . . . . The same is true in respect to a claim
that a share’s higher price is lower than it would otherwise have
126
been . . . .
Echoing that sentiment and standing in accord with the
Supreme Court, the SEC—which promulgated Rule 10b-5—asserted
that, under these circumstances, a plaintiff does not suffer any loss at
the time of purchase since she can immediately sell the shares
127
without a loss. In light of these assertions, not only does the Second
Circuit’s logic seem unconvincing—and possibly foreclosed—but the
district courts’ analyses seem superior, since it extends the principles
of both Dura and the SEC.
As a result, the reasoning in a case like Ross v. Walton should
have been more persuasive to the Second Circuit. Read broadly, Ross
is fairly analogous to Acticon—the plaintiffs had a chance to sell their
securities for a profit after the class period ended but elected not
128
to.
In Ross, the court held that “if the stock’s value was
commensurate to the pre-disclosure trading price after the close of
the class period [and] could have been sold at a profit, the ‘actual
124

Id. at 40 (quoting Dura, 544 U.S. at 342).
Id. at 41.
126
Dura, 544 U.S. at 342–43 (emphasis added).
127
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564, at
*21–22.
128
Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42–43 (D.D.C. 2009).
125

ARGANBRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/10/2014 3:53 PM

296

[Vol. 44:279

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
129

economic loss’ contemplated in Dura is precluded.”
The Ross court further noted that even if there was “loss”—the
issue in Acticon—Dura still requires a plaintiff to show that it was the
corrective disclosure and not “one of the [other] ‘tangle of factors’
130
that affect[ed] price.” The Ross court then summarized its analysis
by concluding that “[l]ogically, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate the
amount the purchaser overpaid if the stock value rose greater than
131
the purchase price on multiple occasions.”
Thus, these assertions
mesh with and extend Dura’s conclusion that the securities fraud
statutes are not meant to “provide investors with broad insurance
against market losses, but to protect them against those economic
132
losses that misrepresentations actually cause.”
In this respect, and
as an integral part of this overarching debate, the Court’s reasoning
was based on economic loss, so it seems logical that a prospective gain
would extend the Court’s analysis and yield no remedy for the
133
plaintiffs in Acticon.
Additionally, the Second Circuit should have given more
credence—if it paid any attention at all—to the plaintiff’s damages
134
expert in In re Veeco.
In that case, the plaintiff’s damages expert
concluded that “[i]f either the inflation or price increased over the
holding period for any particular share, that share was not damaged,
135
so the damage for that share is zero.”
As a result, the court
ultimately concluded that any “[p]laintiffs who chose to retain their
shares past the point when the stock price first recovered to the value
at which the shares were purchased, can prove no economic loss that
is
attributable
to
any
of
the
defendants’
alleged
misrepresentations”—a conclusion that the In re Veeco court noted
136
comported with the damages expert’s deductions.
Furthermore, the Acticon decision seems to stand in contrast to
the Court’s attempt to narrow Rule 10b-5 in Dura. Specifically, the
Court seemed to “err[] on the side of preventing valid suits instead of
137
allowing invalid suits.”
Additionally, “[b]y attempting to prevent
129

Id. at 43.
Id.
131
Id.
132
Dura, 544 U.S. at 345.
133
See id.
134
See In re Veeco Instruments, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05-MD-01695(CM)(GAY),
2007 WL 7630569, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2007).
135
Id. at *6.
136
Id. at *7.
137
Matthew L. Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market-Based
130
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‘largely’ groundless suits along with completely groundless suits . . .
the Supreme Court appears to provide courts guidance to error on
138
the side of dismissing suits with [tenuous causal connections],” an
issue that certainly comes into play when a security’s price equals or
exceeds a plaintiff’s purchase price after the end of the class period.
Finally, the Second Circuit noted, as part of its conclusion, that it
was not aware of any federal appellate court or Supreme Court cases
that had applied Malin’s interpretation of Dura and the securities
fraud laws to cases where a stock price reached or exceeded a
139
plaintiff’s purchase price subsequent to a corrective disclosure.
This observation seems overstated, however, as there do not appear
to be any federal appellate court or Supreme Court cases that have
adopted the Second Circuit’s reasoning when applied to an
analogous situation. In fact, this was an issue of first impression for
140
the Second Circuit —which includes Wall Street within its
jurisdiction—so the lack of support for Malin’s reasoning at the
federal appellate levels should be neither dispositive nor persuasive.
Regardless, for the aforementioned reasons, the Second Circuit has
misinterpreted Dura and the relevant securities laws, and the district
courts’ analyses of Dura are superior.

B. The Second Circuit Could Have Exacted a Heightened Pleading
Standard on the Plaintiffs for Proving Economic Loss and/or Could
Have Constructed Loss Causation Under the PSLRA Differently
Even if the Second Circuit found the district courts’
interpretation of Dura unpersuasive, it could have still ruled for the
defendants in two ways. First, the court could have required the
plaintiffs to plead economic loss and loss causation consistent with
Securities Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 48 (2008), available at
http://hayboo.com/files/Publication/e19c0362-4e02-4672-b469
-23791b644cfd/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7f515f2d-d66c-442b-8582
280bf1b53360/Pleading%2520and%2520Proving%2520Loss%2520Causation%2520i
n%2520Fraud-On-The-Market_Based%2520Securities%2520Suits%2520Po.pdf.
138
Id. at 62.
139
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 41 (2d Cir.
2012).
140
Jennifer L. Achilles & Sara R. Wolff, Second Circuit Holds that Stock Price Rebound
after Disclosure of Fraud Does Not Negate Inference of Economic Loss at Pleading Stage of
Securities
Fraud
Suit
(Aug.
23,
2012),
REEDSMITH.COM,
http://www.reedsmith.com/Second-Circuit-Holds-that-Stock-Price-Rebound-after
-Disclosure-of-Fraud-Does-Not-Negate-Inference-of-Economic-Loss-at-Pleading-Stage
-of-Securities-Fraud-Suit-08-23-2012/.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Next, the Second Circuit could
have construed the term “loss causation” for 10b-5 claims consistently
with the PSLRA’s definition of loss causation for § 12(a) claims under
the Securities Act of 1933 (“the Securities Act”). This section analyzes
how both determinations could have affected the outcome of Acticon.
1.

Heightened Pleading Standard for Economic
Loss/Loss Causation

At the outset, the Second Circuit acknowledged in Acticon that,
“[a]fter Dura, it is unclear whether the plaintiffs must satisfy the
‘short and plain statement of the claim’ standard demanded by Rule
8(a)(2) or the more stringent heightened pleading requirements of
141
Rule 9(b) in pleading economic loss.” The court then recognized
that it could not find any federal circuit court decisions that
addressed heightened pleading for economic loss, but that it had
142
found a few decisions pertaining to the standard for loss causation.
Specifically, the Second Circuit noted that the Fourth Circuit had
imposed a heightened pleading standard for loss causation, the Fifth
Circuit had not, and the Ninth Circuit had found it unnecessary to
143
decide. As a result, the Second Circuit held that “[b]ecause we find
that the price fluctuations here would not rebut an inference of
economic loss under either standard, we, like the Ninth Circuit, find
144
it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.”
While the consequences of punting on the heightened pleading
145
standard issue are analyzed in greater depth infra, the Second
Circuit could have—and perhaps should have—adopted a
heightened pleading standard for proving economic loss and loss
causation, a determination that would have changed the outcome of
the case. The first issue is whether the PSLRA itself requires a
heightened pleading standard for these elements. This argument
can be dismissed, as the PSLRA explicitly provides that a plaintiff
must “state with particularity” the facts surrounding both a material
146
misstatement or omission and state of mind.
Thus, one would
reasonably expect that if Congress intended to exact a heightened
pleading standard for economic loss and/or loss causation, it would
141
142
143
144
145
146

Acticon, 692 F.3d at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
See infra Part IV.C.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(A) (2010).
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have done so in the statute.
Whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure necessitate a
heightened pleading standard, however, is another matter. For
example, in Ross v. Walton, the court reasoned that “[b]ecause a claim
under § 10(b) involves fraud, [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 9(b)
requires plaintiffs to plead ‘the circumstances constituting fraud’ with
147
particularity.” This reasoning is persuasive for a few reasons. First,
before the PSLRA codified the elements of a § 10(b) claim, those
148
private actions largely resembled common law fraud cases. Second,
as part of a plaintiff’s prima facie case, a plaintiff must still plead
149
150
scienter—a staple of common law fraud cases —with particularity.
In that respect, it seems logical to determine that because § 10(b)
claims sound in fraud, both traditionally and currently, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would require heightened pleading. In fact,
this logic is both persuasive and seems to comport with Supreme
Court jurisprudence given the emphasis that the Court placed on the
151
similarities between common law fraud and § 10(b) cases in Dura.
Alternatively, in Katyle v. Penn National Gaming, Inc., the Fourth
Circuit set forth some compelling reasons for why the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure demand a heightened pleading standard for loss
152
causation in 10b-5 cases.
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit cited
Supreme Court precedent, which noted that, “[p]rior to the
enactment of the PSLRA, the sufficiency of a complaint for securities
fraud was governed not by [the general pleading standard of] Rule 8,
153
but by the heightened pleading standard set forth in Rule 9(b).”
Now, since the PSLRA explicitly provides for a heightened pleading
standard for a few elements, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
154
statute supersedes Rule 9(b) in those regards. Since the PSLRA was
silent as to the rest of the elements, however, the Fourth Circuit
147

Ross v. Walton, 668 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2009).
See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 253 (1988) (“In general, the case law
developed in this Court with respect to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been based on
doctrines with which we, as judges, are familiar: common-law doctrines of fraud and
deceit.”).
149
See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 705 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that common law fraud cases typically require proof
of scienter).
150
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
151
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–45 (2005).
152
637 F.3d 462, 471–72 n.5 (4th Cir. 2011).
153
Id. at n.5 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308,
319 (2007)).
154
Id.
148
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asserted that the statute does not affect past Supreme Court
jurisprudence, meaning that Rule 9(b) still applies to those
155
elements.
In Dura, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify the
PSLRA’s effect on the requisite pleading standard for loss causation,
but the Court opted not to, determining that the plaintiffs could not
156
satisfy the pleading standard under either Rule 8 or Rule 9. Given
that deduction, the Court assumed, “for argument’s sake, that neither
the Rules nor the securities statutes impose any special further
requirement in respect to the pleading of proximate causation or
157
economic loss.”
Nevertheless, absent further Supreme Court
clarification, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation—decided six years
after Dura—seems the most reasonable. As a result, the Second
Circuit, although under no obligation to accept the Fourth Circuit’s
logic, would have been justified if it had adopted a similar view.
2.

An Alternative Construction of the PSLRA Could Have
Defeated the Plaintiffs’ Complaint in Acticon

Although it is unclear whether the defendants in Acticon raised
the following argument, the defendants could have prevailed on an
alternative interpretation of the PSLRA and its definition of “loss
causation.” The Second Circuit’s decision in Acticon is premised on
economic loss grounds, but, again, for the purposes of this Comment,
the two elements go hand-in-hand, since even a plaintiff who can
prove economic loss must still show that the defendant’s alleged
158
fraud was the proximate cause of that loss.
As to that alternative interpretation, in the petitionerdefendant’s brief to the Supreme Court in Dura, it argued that, under
the principle of uniformity, the Court should consistently apply the
PSLRA’s definition of loss causation in § 105, which amended and
159
applied to § 12(a)(2) cases under the Securities Act, with the term
160
“loss causation” used in Rule 10b-5 cases. Currently, the difference
is that § 105 of the PSLRA provides an affirmative defense to §
161
12(a)(2) cases if the defendant can prove lack of loss causation.
155

Id.
Dura, 544 U.S. at 346.
157
Id. (emphasis added).
158
See supra Part II.
159
See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2006).
160
Brief of Petitioners, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No.
03-932), 2004 WL 2075752, at *18–21.
161
See 15 U.S.C. § 77l(b) (2006).
156
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Under § 105 of the PSLRA, § 12 plaintiffs cannot recover damages if
the defendant “proves that any . . . or all of the [recoverable]
amount . . . represents [something] other than the depreciation in
value of the subject security resulting from [the alleged material
162
misstatements or omissions].”
If this definition of loss causation
were applied to § 10(b) claims as well, then a defendant could defeat
a Rule 10b-5 claim by showing that the security price subsequent to
the end of the class period equaled or exceeded the plaintiff’s
purchase price. Although the Supreme Court did not address this
argument in Dura, the SEC appears to support this construction,
because it argued in its amicus brief to the Court that the PSLRA’s
definition of loss causation should be consistent for both § 10(b)
cases under the Exchange Act and § 12 cases under the Securities
163
Act.
Even if the defendant in Acticon did not raise this argument, the
Second Circuit could have considered it as part of its overall analysis
of the PSLRA. Regardless, this interpretation, which is seemingly
supported by the SEC, could be used in the future to defeat the
Second Circuit’s interpretation and to uphold the five district courts’
rulings.
C. The Consequences of the Acticon Decision
In Acticon, the Second Circuit ultimately determined that
“[b]ecause we find that the price fluctuations here would not rebut
an inference of economic loss under either standard, we, like the
164
Ninth Circuit, find it unnecessary to resolve this issue at this time.”
This Comment previously discussed why the Second Circuit could or
should have adopted a pleading standard for economic loss and loss
165
causation that was consistent with Rule 9(b), but absent such a
proclamation, the Second Circuit’s decision to abstain from deciding
the issue is also problematic for two reasons. First, the Second
Circuit’s conclusion that the price fluctuations would not have
rebutted an inference of economic loss is questionable, and second,
its decision to punt on the issue, theoretically, leaves the decision up
to the district courts within the Second Circuit.
162

Id.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Dura
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-932), 2004 WL 2069564, at
*25–26.
164
Acticon AG v. China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd., 692 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir.
2012).
165
See supra Part IV.B.1.
163
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By failing to specify a standard, however, one can envision the
tension that would arise if a district court within the Second Circuit
determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applied to a
case analogous to Acticon, and thus concluded that the plaintiff had
failed to sufficiently plead economic loss or loss causation. In this
scenario, the district court—perhaps relying on logic similar to that
of the Fourth Circuit in Katyle—would likely be reversed by the
166
Second Circuit, based on Acticon. Thus, one could reasonably argue
that the Second Circuit, by passing on the issue, impliedly supported
the less stringent pleading standard, suggesting a more plaintifffriendly approach to 10b-5 cases within the Second Circuit.
Next, the Second Circuit held that Acticon had satisfied the
pleading requirements set forth in Dura, since it had “alleged
something more than the mere fact that it purchased NEP shares at
an inflated price; specifically, it allege[d] that the price of NEP stock
167
dropped after the alleged fraud became known.”
This conclusion
seems partly premised on the PSLRA’s “bounce back” provision and
the average stock price over the ninety days following the final
corrective disclosure, but since the “bounce back” provision is a
damages cap, this conclusion is questionable for a few reasons.
First, it begs the question whether the Second Circuit would find
that a plaintiff had met the pleading standard for a § 10(b) claim if
the security price rose immediately after the corrective disclosure—
for example, the very next day after a corrective disclosure. If that
were the case—that an immediate gain would break any causal link
between the alleged fraud and any “loss”—then how immediately
must the gain occur? In Acticon, NEP’s stock eclipsed the plaintiffs’
purchase price on twelve different occasions, with the first instance
168
occurring as soon as a month after the final corrective disclosure.
Following that logic, it seems that a plaintiff could sufficiently plead a
§ 10(b) claim so long as the stock price did not immediately rise after a
corrective disclosure. If this analysis overextends the Second Circuit’s
logic, however, the alternative view seems to be an arbitrary
determination of how long after a corrective disclosure a stock price
can recover before it falls outside of Acticon’s holding—one week?
Two weeks? Seemingly not one month, though, or NEP would have
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In re China N.E. Petroleum Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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prevailed.
Next, the Second Circuit was persuaded to dismiss NEP’s motion
to dismiss because the plaintiffs had alleged “something more” than
170
the Dura plaintiffs, who had merely claimed an inflated stock price;
namely, the plaintiffs in Acticon had alleged that “the price of NEP
171
stock dropped after the alleged fraud became known.” As a result,
this seems to suggest that any plaintiff who can both claim that she
purchased securities at an artificially inflated price and can point to
evidence that the stock price dropped after a corrective disclosure
has met the pleading standards. By this logic, though, it seems too
easy for plaintiffs to meet the pleading standard in an analogous §
10(b) case. To illustrate, while publicly traded companies may
occasionally have to issue corrective disclosures, not all of them will
172
be pursuant to nefarious actions by the company.
Under a broad
interpretation of the Second Circuit’s holding, however, all a plaintiff
has to do—assuming all other 10b-5 elements are equal—is show that
there was both a corrective disclosure and an immediate drop in the
stock price. Therein lies a problem, though, because the security in
question might have dropped on that particular day for reasons
completely unrelated to the corrective disclosure—for example, poor
earnings in the relevant quarter from a properly filed form, industrywide news affecting all relevant stock prices, or the potential merger
of the company-in-question’s two biggest competitors. As it now
stands, however, a corrective disclosure coupled with a drop in stock
price seems sufficient to plead economic loss and/or loss causation
173
under Acticon. While satisfying the pleading standard in the federal
174
court system is not meant to be an arduous task, Acticon’s holding
may inevitably lead to more frivolous lawsuits—the very thing that
169

See id.
Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40.
171
Id.
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See Michael Coffino & Marc Goldich, To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Public Company
Strategies in Packaging Corrective Disclosures in Press Releases (2008),
http://www.adlawbyrequest.com/2008/07/articles/forums/
to-bundle-or-not-to-bundle-public-company-strategies-in-packaging
-corrective-disclosures-in-press-releases/ (arguing that viewing “corrective disclosures
in a vacuum can precipitate a rush to judgment by potential class action plaintiffs or
their lawyers . . . to launch a securities fraud class action”).
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See Acticon, 692 F.3d at 40–41.
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See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible [i.e. not “probable”] on its face.’”).
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Congress designed the PSLRA to prevent. Additionally, most 10b-5
176
cases that pass the pleading stage are likely to settle, since, beyond
that point, it is probably more cost-effective for the defendant to pay
out—even if it has done nothing wrong—rather than engage in what
would likely be an expensive discovery process.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Second Circuit’s decision causes a lot of
uncertainty. The five federal district court cases that addressed this
issue have all interpreted Dura and the relevant securities fraud
statutes in a similar way, bringing some clarity. With its holding, the
Second Circuit has created confusion in this area of the law, and has
given future defendants one less arrow in their quiver with which to
defeat these claims before proceeding to the costly stage of discovery.
Moving forward, the Supreme Court should clarify a few of the main
issues from Acticon soon—specifically, whether Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8 or 9 applies to economic loss and loss causation, and,
more importantly, whether a plaintiff is or is not precluded as a
matter of law from pleading economic loss or loss causation when her
stock price becomes commensurate to her purchase price following a
corrective disclosure. Until then, future defendants within the
Second Circuit will have to live with a decision that, legally and
logically, seems to contravene both the principles of the federal
securities laws and past Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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